



**Director of
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USSR: *Pravda* on Leadership Continuity

A *Pravda* article on Thursday praising Brezhnev on the first anniversary of his death probably is intended to reassure the Soviet public that, despite General Secretary Andropov's current incapacitation, the party will provide continuity in policy. While lauding Brezhnev's contribution to foreign policy as well as domestic policy—particularly in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Kazakhstan—it stressed the continuity of the party leadership and its unity, embodied in the election of Andropov. The article reaffirmed Andropov's discipline campaign and stated that continuity does not signify complacency but an interest in moving forward. []

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Comment: The leadership had been largely silent on Brezhnev's contribution over the last year and his closest Politburo colleagues—Chernenko, Tikhonov, Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy—probably urged publication of this article. In return, Andropov and his supporters got a clear reaffirmation of his continued supremacy and of the importance of his discipline campaign. []

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NICARAGUA: Diplomatic Initiative

During his three-day tour last week of Contadora capitals—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama—Junta Coordinator Ortega sought to present evidence of an alleged US plan to invade Nicaragua and to gain support for the Sandinistas' peace initiatives. According to the Mexican Ambassador to Nicaragua, Mexico resisted Ortega's appeals to approach the US jointly with the other Contadora countries to forestall an invasion. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Sandinistas probably believe there is an increased risk of US military intervention in Nicaragua after the events in Grenada. They may be seeking, however, to exploit similar concerns in the region to promote their emphasis on bilateral solutions. The Nicaraguan peace plan differs from the Contadora proposals in that it presents a US-Nicaragua bilateral treaty and a multilateral treaty on El Salvador that tends to give legitimacy to the insurgents. The Nicaraguans are likely to continue to resist Central American efforts to focus on treaty commitments to implementing democracy. [REDACTED]

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NORTH YEMEN: New Cabinet Changes

President Salih's extensive cabinet changes yesterday probably are intended to deflect blame for Sanaa's deepening financial crisis and to appeal to Saudi Arabia, North Yemen's principal economic benefactor. The appointment of Abdel Ghani as Prime Minister—along with 12 other ministerial changes—marks the first major cabinet shakeup since 1980. Ghani is a US-educated economist known for his centrist political orientation and technical competence. Both the new Foreign Minister and the Minister of Education reportedly have links to Saudi-supported North Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood groups. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The cabinet changes are mainly cosmetic and will have little effect on financial problems. Salih is powerless to halt the country's economic decline without substantially increased foreign assistance, which the Saudis apparently were not persuaded to provide at the Saudi-Yemeni joint Economic Commission meetings last week. By making Western-educated technocrats and pro-Saudi politicians the main beneficiaries of the cabinet changes, Salih may be trying to appease the Saudis and allay their concerns about Sanaa's continuing close ties to the USSR. [REDACTED]


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PAKISTAN: New Turmoil

Violence erupted again in Sind Province on Saturday when opposition leaders—after three weeks of calm—called for a day of national protest. Press reports say police used tear gas to disperse demonstrations of some 1,000 people each in at least three provincial cities. In addition, authorities in Hyderabad killed three people when 150 political prisoners rioted after hearing that six opposition leaders arrested last August would continue to be held without trial. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Although there have been reports that Sindhi extremists—who represent a small part of the opposition—had threatened to increase antigovernment violence if President Zia did not talk with political leaders by mid-November, it is unlikely they were directly involved in the latest violence. Nevertheless, if the opposition is able to sustain the new turmoil, Zia may be forced to negotiate in earnest with moderate opposition leaders. [REDACTED]

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USSR-UN: Soviet Peace Propaganda

The Soviets are pressing their peace themes at the General Assembly session, intensely criticizing US arms control proposals. They have spoken more than five times longer than any other delegation. Some representatives of the Nonaligned Movement have privately expressed displeasure at this performance, but some Soviet proposals, particularly the draft treaty on outer space arms control, have received favorable responses. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Soviets are attempting to seize the propaganda initiative on peace issues during the current session to maintain the momentum of the West European peace movement despite the beginning of INF deployments. They probably believe the peace movement will be valuable in attempting to limit the number of missiles deployed. The favorable response to the Soviet proposal for an outer space arms control agreement reflects hope that it could reduce new arms spending and thereby make more funds available for economic development. [REDACTED]


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Special Analysis

LEBANON: The Radical Shias

Radical Shia groups will continue terrorist attacks against targets of opportunity in Lebanon. These groups probably were responsible for the bombings at the US and French compounds last month, and they also may have carried out the attack on the Israeli military facility in southern Lebanon. Backed by Iran, radical Shia leaders want to convert Lebanon into a fundamentalist Islamic state and have no interest in finding a compromise solution to the country's factional problems. These groups probably will attract increasing popular support, if moderates—such as Amal leader Nabih Barri—fail to win political and economic gains for the Shias.

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The disorder and lawlessness that plague Lebanese society after eight years of civil war have allowed extremist groups to conceal many of their activities and have made it difficult to identify their leaders and members. A group of radical Shia clerics and politicians, often referred to as Hizb Allah, or Party of God, apparently functions as a coordinating committee for most radical Shias. The term Hizb Allah, however, is also used generally to refer to several radical Shia groups.

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The largest of these groups is Islamic Amal, led by Husayn Musawi. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Musawi broke away from Barri's mainline Amal organization and set up headquarters in Ba'labakk with about 500 followers.

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The Husayni Suicide Forces, based in Beirut's southern suburban slums, are associated with Islamic Amal. Its leaders apparently recruit and train Shias for specific terrorist missions.

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Another radical Shia group is the Union of Muslim Students, led by Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, an influential radical Shia cleric. Fadlallah and his followers, probably numbering fewer than 100 men, also operate in the Shia suburbs of Beirut.

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The bombings last month of the US and French MNF compounds probably were planned and carried out by Islamic Amal and the Husayni Suicide Forces. The Union of Muslim Students probably was aware of the planned attacks and may have had an indirect role in

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
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Nabih Barri
Leader Shiite Amal Movement



Husayn Musawi
Leader of Pro-Iranian
Islamic Amal Movement

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supporting the operation. [REDACTED]

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Ties With Iran

Radical Shia groups are allied with Iranian Revolutionary Guards operating in the Bekaa Valley. [REDACTED]

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The Revolutionary Guards provide training, financial assistance, and military equipment to their Shia allies. [REDACTED]

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Relations With Amal

Nabih Barri so far has been unable to control the activities of these radical Shia groups. He has, for example, attempted to interdict arms shipments headed for radical Shias in the capital's southern suburbs, but his militia has had only partial success. [REDACTED]

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Barri's ability to combat his opponents is also hampered by the fact that some Amal members secretly support the activities of the radical Shias. In addition, Barri wants to avoid antagonizing the Iranian Government. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Although the membership of these radical groups is small, their ability to carry out successful attacks against MNF contingents and the Israeli Army probably will increase their popular support. Radical leaders apparently have little difficulty recruiting Shia zealots for suicide missions. Many Shias believe that their moderate leaders have done little to improve the community's position in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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Barri's recent statements criticizing the MNF presence in Beirut and calling for the abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement may have been intended to win back wavering supporters. If Barri does agree to political compromises with the government, the radical Shia groups may try to kill him. []

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Radical Shia leaders are likely to believe that any US or Lebanese Government attacks against them would eventually work to their advantage. They probably reason that such attacks would not significantly damage their capabilities but would increase Shia opposition to the US role in Lebanon and to the government of President Gemayel. The radical groups almost certainly will respond to any attacks by carrying out previously planned terrorist operations against US and Lebanese Government targets. []

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